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The paper determines whether the incumbent should be favored at the reprocurement stage, 
and how the slope of his incentive scheme should evolve over time. It results from our analysis that 
the gains from second sourcing are not as high as one might hope. 
Last it reinterprets the second source as a raider, and the breakout as a takeover. It discusses
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of managerial stock options, the amount of defensive tactics, the firm's performance and the 
probability of a takeover. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The regulation of a natural monopoly is often a repeated matter. If the regulated monopoly's 
performance is not adequate, it may be in the regulator's interest to look for another firm (or team of 
managers) to replace the incumbent. Second sourcing indeed occurs in the reprocurement of defense 
contracts, in the repeated bidding of franchises or in private contracting. Should auctions be set up, 
that sequentially pick the regulated firm? Should such auctions be concerned with bidding parity 
between the incumbent and the entrants? What is the incumbent firm's incentive to invest in 
physical capital? In human capital? The determination of the optimal breakout policy and its 
interaction with incentive schemes are the topics of this paper. 
The "Chicago approach" to regulating a natural monopoly (Demsetz (1968) , Stigler (1968) , 
Posner (1972)) suggests that a monopoly franchise be awarded to the firm that offers to supply the 
product on the best terms. Franchise bidding may also be repeated over time to adjust for new, non­
contracted-for circumstances or to encourage entry of another, more efficient firm. It allows the 
regulator to select the most efficient supplier at any point of time. Williamson (1976), 1 responding
to this approach, has forcefully made the following points. 2
1) Physical capital, and even more human capital, are not always easily transferable from
one firm to the other. Hence symmetry between the firms is unusual at the franchise
renewal stage. The incumbent enjoys an advantage over its competitors.
2) Even when the incumbent's capital is transferable, the corresponding investment is hard
to measure. This is clearly true for non-monetary investments; for instance, the quality
of past investment choices admits no monetary measure. Furthermore, accounting
manipulations garble the measurement of monetary investments. For instance, the
incumbent can integrate into supply or arrange kickbacks from the equipment suppliers;
or he can affect depreciation charges. The prospect of possibly being replaced by an
entrant lowers the incumbent's incentive to invest in capital which he will not be able
__ _ _ _  t9 transfer at the right price. 3 
These two points form the building blocks of our model. We assume that part of the 
incumbent's investment is transferable (general) and part is non-transferable (specific) (point 1) . 
Furthermore the regulator can observe the regulated firm's cost (or profit) , but is unable to recover 
2 
the precise amount of investment from this aggregate accounting data (point 2). 
The model has two periods. In the first, the regulator offers an incentive contract to a single
firm (the incumbent, the first source). The incumbent's cost (which is the only variable observed by 
the regulator) is a function of the firm's intrinsic productivity or efficiency, the firm's first period 
"effort" and a monetary investment (by a simple relabelling of variables, the model also allows for a 
non-monetary investment) . The firm knows its productivity and chooses both effort and investment. 
In the second period (reprocurement stage), the regulator can keep the incumbent or invite another 
firm (the entrant, the second source) to replace the incumbent. The entrant's intrinsic productivity is 
known to the entrant only and can be higher or lower than the incumbent's. The second-period cost 
of the selected firm depends on its efficiency, its second-period effort and on first-period investment 
(the entire investment for the incumbent, and only the transferable part for the entrant) . We assume 
that the incumbent's and the entrant's efficiency parameters are drawn from a common distribution 
(that is, we attribute any ex-ante intrinsic discrepancy in second-period efficiency to non-transferable 
investment) .  
We focus on the interaction between the breakout rule and the intertemporal evolution of  the 
slope of the incumbent's incentive scheme (optimal incentive schemes tum out to be linear in cost) . 
We say that bidding parity obtains when the regulator selects the entrant if and only if his second­
period efficiency exceeds the incumbent's, where these efficiencies include the effect of the first­
period investment. The regulator favors the incumbent when he selects the entrant only if the entrant 
is sufficiently more efficient than the incumbent; and conversely. The Chicago school's 
recommendation alluded to above is tantamount to boosting bidding parity. 
In the case of a transferable investment, any cost savings from the investment become 
savings for the second source if the first source is replaced. Because the investment is not observable 
and so cannot be compensated directly, the incumbent has too little incentive to invest since with 
some positive probability, the fruits of this costly investment will accrue to the second source. The 
regulator optimally uses both the breakout rule and the intertemporal evolution of the incentive 
scheme to correct this extemality. First he favors the incumbent at the reprocurement stage to 
increase his incentive to invest (to see why this is optimal, note that a small departure from bidding 
parity implies only a negligible loss in ex-post productive efficiency). Second he provides for time­
increasing incentives. The incumbent bears a small fraction of his first-period cost and therefore 
perceives investment as cheap. In contrast, he bears a high fraction of his second-period cost (if his 
contract is renewed), which, ex-ante gives him much incentive to invest. 
The policy recommendations are quite different in the case of a non-trans/ erable investment. 
In this case, the incumbent fully internalizes the social value of his cost savings, so that the previous 
extemality does not exist. There however is a new effect: The incumbent has "on average" a cost 
advantage at the reprocurement stage. Our result, reminiscent of the theory of auctions with 
asymmetric bidders, is that, if the distribution of potential efficiencies satisfies the classic monotone 
hazard rate property, the auction should be biased in favor of the higher cost firm, i.e. , the entrant. 
The slope of the incumbent's incentive scheme should be time-invariant. 
Section II sets up the model, and section III solves for the optimal breakout rule and 
incentive schemes. Section IV studies a variant of the model in which the first-period effort to 
reduce first-period cost also reduces the second-period cost. This "learning-by-doing" investment 
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where p is the same parameter as in period 1 and e 2 is the effort exerted in period 2, at disutility
'lf(e z) .
The (potential) entrant has in period 2 a cost function: 
c' = p' -e' -ki. (3) 
p' e [�.�] is the entrant's intrinsic cost parameter and is learned at the beginning of period 2
and e' is his level of effort. The entrant has the same function of disutility of effort as the 
incumbent. An additive uncertainty could be added to the costs without any change in our results, as
will be clear from the cost linearity of optimal contracts. 
Remark on non-monetary investments: In the introduction, we claimed that our model depicts both
monetary and non-monetary investments. The formulation above assumes a monetary investment 
(d (i) increases the first-period cost). To substantiate our claim, suppose that there is no monetary
investment. The first-period cost is then 
where e is the effort expected to reduce the first-period cost. The incumbent's managers exert a 
second-type of effort, that reduces the incumbent's second-period cost by e (and the entrant's cost
by k e ) . The first-period effort to obtain this cost reduction is d (e ) , so that the total first-period
disutility of effort is 'lf(e + d (e)). One may think of d (e) as the number of hours spent in the first­
period on finding the right technology for the second period. A simple change in variables shows 
that this model is formally equivalent to the monetary investment model set up above: let 
e 1 = e + d (e) denote the total first-period effort, and i = e. Then, the first-period cost can be
written: 
C1 = P-(e1 -d{e)) = P-e1 + d (i) . 
The parameters P and p' are independently drawn from the same distribution with c.d.f. F CP)
and density function/ CP) continuous and positive on [p,�] with dA [F CP)lf CP)1�0.5 - dp 
The regulator's problem is to organize production and transfers so as to maximize social 
welfare. 
The incumbent's expected utility level is: 
(4) 
where o is the discount factor, 1t is the probability that the incumbent will remain active in period 2,
t =ti+ 8t2 is the net (i.e., in addition to the payment of realized costs by the regulator) expected 
(present discounted) transfer received by the firm from the regulator. 
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We will assume that the regulator has the ability to commit to two-period regulatory 
schemes. 6 To obtain the incumbent' s participation the regulator must ensure that 7 
u �o 
where the individual rationality (IR) level has been normalized to zero. 
The entrant's utility level, if it is active in period 2, is: 
V = t' -'lf(e') 
where t ' is the (expected) net transfer received from the regulator. The entrant's I.R. constraint is:
v �o. 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
An utilitarian regulator wishes to maximize the sum of expected utilities of consumers and
firms. Under complete information his instruments are the levels of investment, efforts, the transfers 
and the breakout rule (i. e., the choice of who is active in period 2) .
Complete information implies that the (potential) entrant should be allowed to enter iff 
p' < B*CP.n = P - o -k )i.
Letting 'A denote the shadow cost of public funds, the consumers' expected utility level is: 
S - (1 + A-)(C 1 + t1) + 8(1 - F CP*CB.i ))[S - (1 + A.)(C 2 + t2)]
assuming that consumers have the same discount factor as the incumbent. 
Since A> 0, the IR constraints (5) and (7) are binding in the regulator's optimizaiion
program. This program thus reduces to: 
Max {S (1+8) - (1 + A)(p - e1 + d(i) + 'lf(e1)){e1,e2,e',i} 
- o(l - F CP - (1 - k )i))(l + A-)CP - e2 - i + \jf(ez))
' ' 8 where· e I, t: 2and-i are functions of ·p-ande- is a-function-of p-. This is a quasi�concaveproblem 
with first-order conditions: 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
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d '(i) = C>[(l -F((3-(l -k)i)) +kF((3-(l -k)i)]. 
(11) tells us that investment should be set at the level that equates its marginal cost, d' (i ),
with its expected social marginal utility which is() if the investment is transferable (k = 1), but only
o(l -F ((3 -i )) if it is not (k = 0). The positive externality of the first-period investment on the
entrant's cost must be internalized when it exists. (10) says that the marginal disutility of each type 
of effort must be equated to its marginal benefit. 
In the next section we solve the regulator's optimization problem under incomplete
infonnation. 
III. OPTIMAL REGULATION UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
Suppose that the regulator still observes costs but does not know the parameters f3 and W 
(even though it knows their distribution), and that it cannot observe effort levels. We also assume 
that the investment is unobservable by the regulator (the case of observable investment will be 
treated as a special case.) 
The regulator's instruments are now cost reimbursement rules as well as a breakout rule. 
Using the revelation principle, this regulatory procedure can be viewed as a revelation mechanism 
for the incumbent composed of a contract (C 1((3) , C2((3), t ((3)) and a breakout rule (3*((3) and as a
revelation mechanism for the entrant (C'(f3'/(3), t'(f3'/(3)). In this section, we use the abstract
framework provided by the revelation principle to characterize the optimal allocation (efforts, 
investment, breakout rule). In section VI, we show how this optimal allocation can be implemented
through familiar mechanisms like linear cost reimbursement rules, auctions and cancellation fees, 
and we develop some further empirical implications of the optimal regulatory scheme. 
Before proceeding we should make a methodological point concerning the amount of 
infonnation received by the entrant about the incumbent's productivity. The revelation principle 
tells us that the principal may w.l.o.g. ask the incumbent to truthfully announce his type: p = (3.
Should � be revealed to the entrant? If not, the incumbent's first-period cost still reveals
infonnation about the incumbent's productivity. Is it worth distorting the first-period allocation to 
garble the entrant's information about (3? For instance, if the optimal first-period regulation implies
that C 1 perfectly reveals f3 (as will be the case here), would one want to induce some first-period
pooling, so that the entrant would possess less infonnation about f3 than the principal and possibly
would bid more agressively? Fortunately the answer is no. Maskin and Tirole (1986), in their study 
of contracts designed by an infonned principal, (here the regulator), show that, if preferences are 
quasi-linear (as is the case in this paper), the design of the contract for the entrant does not depend
on whether the agent (here the entrant) knows the principal's infonnation or not. Hence there is no 
point hiding the announcement p from the entrant or distorting the first-period allocation.9
Let U ((3) be the rent extracted by an incumbent of type (3. Following Laffont and Tirole
(1987a), the incumbent's incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints can be 
written: 
U((3) =-'Jl'(f3-C 1(f3) + d (i))-O(l -F((3*((3))) 'Jl'(f3-C2(f3)-i) (12) 
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U (p) = 0 (13) 
with sufficient second-order conditions10
(14) 
Equation (13) says that the least efficient type gets no rent at the optimum. Equation (12) 
stems from the fact that when the incumbent's intrinsic cost parameter is reduced by 1, the 
incumbent can reduce his effort by 1 in each period and obtain the same transfers. His rent is thus 
increased by [\!l'(e 1) + fot\!l'(e2)] where n: = (1 -F CP*CP))) is the probability of no breakout.
Moreover, since investment is non-observable we must consider the (moral hazard) 
constraint11 describing the incumbent's choice of investment: 
(15) 
For, suppose that the firm contemplates a unit increase in investment. The extra investment 
cost is d '(i ). To keep the first-period cost (and thus reward) constant, effort must be increased by 
the same amount, at disutility \!l'(e 1)d'(i ). In tum, the second-period effort can be reduced by 1,
saving disutility \!l'(e2), with probability 1 -F CP*(p)). 
Similarly, let V (pt!p) be the rent extracted by an entrant of cost characteristic P' when the
incumbent's type is p. The entrant's incentive and IR constraints can be written:
(16) 
(17) 
with the second order condition ��; ;::: 0.
Integrating (16) with (17) as a boundary condition yields 
(18) 
Using U and V as state variables, the regulator's maximization problem can be written as
the following optimal control problem: 
Max �fj {S(l + 8) -(1+A)(C1(P ) + 'VCP - C 1CP)) + d (i) ) )  - AU (p)
- 0(1 -F CP*CP))(t + A)(C 2CP) + wcP - i - c 2CPm 
(19) 
s.t. (12) (13) (15) (16) (17) 
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In this formulation, the regulator's objective function has been rewritten to separate the 
efficiency costs of the form (1 + 'A)(C +'If) and the "distributional" costs 'AU and 'AV. 
Remark 1: As some second-order conditions are only sufficient, we do not impose them and check
later that they are satisfied by our solution. 
Remark 2: We do not allow the incumbent's contract to depend on the entrant's realized cost C '
following a breakout. In the case of non-transferable investment, our omission does not involve any 
loss of generality because C' does not contain any information about i .  However, it does involve a
loss of generality for transferable investments (an artifact of the risk neutrality framework is that 
such a dependence would enable the first best level of investment to be achieved with sufficiently 
large penalties). We feel that ignoring such a dependence oft on C' is a good approximation to 
reality for several reasons. First, this dependence would create a delayed transfer or penalty. So the 
displaced incumbent would for instance be required to pay a penalty 5 or 10 years after the breakout 
which raises the issue of the feasibility of such long-run contracts (in contrast, our transfers can 
follow production immediately). Second, and maybe more importantly, the entrant's cost may be 
subject to manipulation. Indeed, ex-post, the entrant and the regulator have an incentive to tinker 
with accounting data on C' so as to force the incumbent to pay a penalty. So letting incumbent's 
reward depend on the entrant's cost may not be feasible after all. Third, in the presence of cost 
uncertainty and risk aversion (or alternatively of limited penalties) , the incumbent would not bear a 
large fraction of its successor's realized cost. To summarize, while some dependence of the 
incumbent's reward on post-termination performance may be feasible in some instances, it is at most 
a limited instrument, which leaves ample scope for the policies described in this paper.12
Solving (19) we obtain: 
Proposition 1: With transferable and unobservable investment, the optimal breakout rule favors the 
incumbent (1)*(13) < 13) except at 13 =�·where bidding parity obtains: 13*(�) = �· Bidding parity
(13*(13) = 13) holds when the investment is transferable and observable. 
Proof: see Appendix.
The intuition of this result is straightfmward. When investment is transferable and 
observable, theregulatorGan direct!� forrethe incumbent to-intem-Olizetlle positive extemality on 
the entrant's cost by imposing the right level of investment. As the firms' efficiencies are drawn 
from the same distributions, bidding parity should hold. Incentives questions remain separate from 
the breakout rule. If investment is unobservable, there is underinvestment because the incumbent 
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has no reason to internalize the extemality. The regulator then mitigates this inefficiency by raising 
the probability that the incumbent remains active in period 2. This is achieved by favoring him in 
the breakout rule. An incumbent of type � has a zero probability of being replaced. He thus invests
the socially optimal amount, and the selection rule need not be biased to encourage investment. 
The next result is that the regulator also alters the incentive schemes to remedy this 
extemality problem. This is best explained by replacing the non-linear transfer functions t ( C ) by
means of linear contracts as in Laffont and Tirole (1986).13
The transfers can then be written (see proof of Proposition 2) 
for the incumbent in period 1 
for the incumbent in period 2 (in case of no breakout) 
t'(C'a , C'!C1) = G'(C'a , C1)-K'(C'a)(C' - C'a) 
for the entrant in period 2 (in case of breakout) 
where ti. t2 and t' are the net transfers (after cost reimbursement) ,  G i. G2 are G' are the fixed
components of the transfers, K 1, K 2, K' the slopes of the incentive schemes (these slopes are equal to
0 for cost-plus contracts and to 1 for fixed-price contracts) , and "a" denotes an expected value.
The interesting questions refer to the slopes of the incentive schemes. We obtain 
Proposition 2: With unobservable and at least partly transferable investment (k > 0), the 
incumbent' s first-period's incentive scheme is "low-powered" relative to the second-period's 
(K 1 < K 2) . Because the observable investment slope is time-invariant and lies between K 1 and K 2, 
unobservability calls for a flatter incentive scheme in the first period and a steeper incentive scheme 
in the second period. 
Proof: see Appendix.
The intuition is that a contract resembling more a cost-plus contract in the first period lowers 
the incumbent's investment cost, while a contract closer to a fixed price contract in the second period 
allows the incumbent to cash the proceeds of the investment. 
-The results-are quite-different when investment is specific. 
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Proposition 3: (i) With unobservable non-transferable investment the optimal breakout rule favors 
the entrant ((3*(13) > P-i ) . (ii) The unobservability of non-transferable investment imposes no cost 
on the regulator. 
Proof: see Appendix.
Part (ii) of Proposition 3 is unsurprising. A classical result in incentive theory is that the 
slope of the incumbent's incentive scheme must be time-invariant if investment is observable (see 
the proof of Proposition 3). Because there is no extemality between the incumbent and the entrant 
when investment is non-transferable, and because the incumbent and the regulator intertemporal 
preferences coincide (due to the constant slope and identical discount factors), the incumbent 
correctly selects the socially optimal investment; that is, unobservability of investment imposes no 
social loss. 
Part (i) of Proposition 3 is more subtle than part (ii) and relies on the monotone hazard rate 
assumption. To understand it, it is convenient to recall the static single firm regulatory problem. Let 
13 be drawn from a cumulative distribution function F ( · ), with density f ( · ) on [�, 13J. When
choosing an incentive scheme for the firm, the regulator must trade off efficiency (which would call 
for a fixed price contract), and minimization of the firm's informational rent (which would call for a 
cost-plus contract). This trade off yields a distortion in the effort allocation for all 13 > �· By
reducing the distortion in effort for parameter 13, the regulator realizes a gain proportional to f ((3). 
At the same time, it must give a higher rent to all types of firms that are more efficient than 13 (in
proportion F ((3)) , because the latter can always mimic the behavior of a less efficient firm. At the
optimum, the marginal gain in efficiency must equal the marginal cost associated with the firm's 
expected rent. Now consider our two-period model. Suppose that the incumbent's and the entrant's 
productivity parameters 13 and W are independently drawn from the same distribution F ( · ) (that is,
we want to attribute any observable discrepancy in intrinsic efficiency to the incumbency 
advantage). Suppose that, in the second period, the regulator does not favor the incumbent or the 
entrant, and consider parameters 13 and W such that the two firms have the same second-period 
intrinsic efficiency. In the presence of specific investment, 13' = 13*((3) = 13 - i < (3. Thus, if we make
the classic assumption that the hazard rate F If is an increasing function, one has
F ((3*)/f ((3*) < F ((3)/ f  ((3). This means that at equal second-period intrinsic efficiency, the optimal
regulation of the entrant calls for less distortion of effort than that of the incumbent. An equivalent 
way of rephrasing this intuition consists in noticing that the selection of a firm amounts to an upward
truncation of the distribution of its productivity parameter. Thus, at equal second-period intrinsic 
efficiency, the regulator is less uncertain about the entrant's productivity than about the incumbent's, 
and therefore can regulate the entrant more efficiently. Specific investments thus call for favoring 
the entrant at the reprocurement stage. We call this effect the rent differential effect. 
An interesting anal()gy \Vith £he literature can be drawn here. Demski, Sappington and
Spiller (1987) offer a second sourcing example in which the purchaser selects the entrant rather than 
the incumbent to be the producer, even though he knows that the incumbent has lower production 
costs (Corollary 5, page 91. For similar results, see Caillaud [1985], and in the classic context of 
auctioning of an object, Myerson [1981] and McAfee-McMillan [1984]). The Demski et al. model 
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does not have any investment. However, the incumbent's and the entrant's production costs are in 
this example drawn from asymmetric distributions: the incumbent's cost distribution is assumed to 
stochastically dominate the entrant's . Our model does presume identical cost distributions ex-ante, 
but the existence of specific investment confers a (statistical) superiority on the incumbent ex-post. 
Like Demski et al., we find that this stochastic dominance by the incumbent calls for favoring the 
entrant. 
Two last points to conclude this section: 
First, in spite of the incentives to invest described in Propositions 1 and 2, it is still the case
that the incumbent underinvests relative to the social optimum.14
Second, a reasonable conjecture is that the bias in the breakout rule (13- i)-Cl3*Cl3) -ki ) be
an increasing function of k .  We have proved this result only in the case of observable investment 
and k in a neighborhood of 1. We suspect the property holds more generally.
IV. LEARNING BY DOING
An interesting variant of our model allows learning by doing rather than investment to 
reduce the second-period cost. We now assume that the incumbent's effort in period 1, e i. affects
costs in period 2. 
(20) 
and 
c' = 13' - e' -ae 1· (21) 
where a ,b  ;;::: 0. That is, the fraction f =a /(a + b) is transferable to the entrant. One may have in
mind that the incumbent exerts effort that yields "tricks" or technologies that reduce his first-period 
production cost, and that will still be used in period 2. 
Under complete information the breakout rule is 13*(13) = 13 - be 1. The optimal effort levels
would be determined by the program: 
Max {S (1+3) -(1+A.)(13-e1+'\jl(e1)){e1,e2,e'} 
(22) 
(3-be 
-3(1 +A) J13 1 (13' -e' -ae 1 + '\jl(e ')) f Cl3)d 13'}
with first order conditions. 15
(23) 
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(24) 
'J/(e) = l . (25) 
In particular (23) equates the marginal disutility of effort to its total marginal social benefit, 
i.e., the first period benefit, 1, plus the transferable effect on second period, Ba , plus the expected
specific effect, ob (1 -F ( � -be 1)). 
Under incomplete information we must add the incentive constraints in the regulator's 
optimization program. Following the same lines of argument as in Section IV we obtain:
Proposition 4: With unobservable and fully transferable learning by doing (b = 0), the breakout 
rule favors the incumbent (�*(�) < �) . 
Proof: See Appendix.
There are now two effects favoring the incumbent: the externality effect of Proposition 1 
and the learning by doing effect. Recall that the incumbent's informational rent comes from the
possibility of mimicking a less efficient type's cost by exerting less effort. Under learning by doing, 
a reduction in the first-period effort reduces the second-period efficiency and rent, and this all the 
more if the probability of keeping the franchise is high. So, the regulator by increasing the 
probability of choosing the incumbent in the second period, makes it more costly for the incumbent 
to hide his efficiency in the first period. This effect (which does not exist for monetary investments) 
calls for favoring the incumbent. 
When learning is partly specific, the relevant comparison for �*CP) is with � -be 1 . Now at
P* = P -be 1 the rent obtained by the incumbent is higher at the parity point and this calls for
favoring the entrant as in Proposition 3. It can be shown that either effect may dominate the other:
see Laffont-Tirole (1987a). In particular, when the learning is purely specific (a = 0), we have two
opposite incentive effects, the learning by doing effect and the rent differential effect. 
A striking feature of the analysis in section III is that the slope of the incumbent's incentive
scheme must be time-increasing to encourage him to invest. In contrast, when investment is
embodied in the first-period effort, lowering the incumbent's cost of investing is achieved through a 
high, rather than low, slope of the first-period incentive scheme. That is, choosing a low first-period 
effort is costly to an incumbent who bears a high fraction of his first-period cost. (Indeed, K 1 (p) 
exceeds 1 for efficient ps , while in the solution in Section III, K 1 CP) ::::; 1 for all p). The next
proposition specializes the model to the "uniform-quadratic case": � is distributed uniformly on 
[�,j3] and '\jf(e) = e2/2 (the result is ambiguous for the more general model):
Proposition 5: With unobservable learning by doing, in the uniform-quadratic case, the first-period 
incentive scheme is steeper than the second-period one: K 1 (p) > K 2(P) for all �· 
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V. DISCUSSION 
Table 1 summarizes the analysis of the optimal allocation: 
Nature of Investment Breakout Rule Time-Invariance of 
Slope of 
Incentive Schemes 
Observable 
Bidding Parity Yes 
Investment 
Unobservable 
Monetary or Incumbent Favored (Externality effect) No (K1 <K2) 
Transferable Nonmonetary 
Investment 
Learning by Incumbent Favored (Extemality effect No 
Doing + learning effect) 
Observable 
Investment 
Entrant Favored (Rent differential effect) Yes 
Unobservable 
Non- Monetary or 
transferable Nonmonetary 
Investment 
Learning by Ambiguous (Two opposite No 
Doing effects: learning 
and rent diffential) 
The previous analysis aimed at generality and allowed many technological patterns. Before 
proceeding, it is worth assessing the relevance of the various effects leading the regulator to rig the 
bidding process. It should be clear that our focus is on sizeable, nonobservable investments. When 
investments matter, breakouts are most likely to be observed (and to be socially desirable) when the 
entrant is not too much at a cost disadvantage, i .e. ,  when it benefits from the incumbent' s  
investment. However, the incumbent should be  favored at  the reprocurement stage precisely when 
investment is transferable. These two facts lead us to a somewhat pessimistic assessment of how 
much regulators can hope to gain by using second sourcing in a natural monopoly situation 
involving substantial investments. Although substantial intrinsic cost differences between the firms 
may justify breakouts, it seems that our recommendations are more likely to apply to industries with 
transferable investments. In the rest of the paper, we focus on such industries. Section VI derives 
some further recommendations and testable implications of our model. Section VII shows how our 
results-apply-tDtakeovers-(we woulci ·argue that in this ease most of the firm-'s·assets are transferable
to a second source, i.e., to a raider). 
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VI. TRANSFERABLE INVESTMENT
We now specialize the model of Section III to transferable investment, a quadratic disutility 
of effort and a uniform distribution of cost parameters: 
Assumption A: 
Al) k = 1 
A2) \jf(e) = e2/2
A3) F( ·) is uniform on [0,1] 
A4) 1 > (2A.)/(1 +A.).
Assumption A4 is technical (and is consistent with the second-order conditions which require that A. 
not be too large). 
We can now state: 
Proposition 6: Under assumption A, 
(i) The bias in favor of the incumbent is higher, the less efficient the incumbent (that is, 
d 
dj3 (p-P*CP)) > O).
(ii) The incumbent exerts more effort in the second period than the type of the entrant which 
makes entry socially indifferent (that is, e2(P) > e '(p*(p))). 
Proof of Proposition 6: See Appendix 1.
Part (i) of Proposition 6 conveys an important intuition: An inefficient incumbent is 
replaced with high probability, and therefore invests little. The bidding process must then be biased 
considerably so as to encourage him to invest. Part ii) compares e 2(p) and e 'CP*CP)). We knew that
e2(p) > e'(p). However, there is a second effect, coming from the fact that P*CP) < p and that e' is
decreasing. The two effects work in opposite directions, but the first dominates. 
We saw in section III that transferable investments call for special incentives to invest: bias 
in the breakout rule and time-increasing incentives. An inefficient incumbent exerts a particularly 
high externality because of a high probability of breakout. Proposition 6 showed that the breakout 
rule is distorted more for inefficient incumbents. Proposition 7 is its counterpart for the distortion in 
the slopes of the incentive scheme: An inefficient incumbent should face incentives that sharply rise 
over time. 
Proposition 7: Under assumption A and if A. is "not too large,"
d
d p  
(K2(P)-K1CP))>O.
Proof available from the authors upon request.
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Proposition 6 enables us to obtain some interesting results on the second-period bidding 
process. Like in Laffont-Tirole [1987b], one can view this bidding process as a first- or second-bid 
auction in which each bidder (here each firm) bids for the right to choose from a menu of monopoly 
linear incentive contracts. Unlike in our earlier auction paper, the menus of contracts differ between 
the two competitors, because of the asymmetry of the problem. Let U2(p) denote the incumbent's
second-period rent associated with the right to choose in his menu of contracts. Similarly, let u' (p')
denote the entrant's second-period rent. From incentive compatibility, we know that: 
and 
U 2( · ) and u' ( · ) are thus defined up to positive constants. Although we will be mainly interested in 
their derivatives, we normalize these functions by imposing second-period individual rationality 
constraints. That is, 
and 
u' <P*<�)) = o 
[recall that the highest p' who may be allowed to produce is P*(�)].
Now consider a second-period first- or second-price auction in which each firm bids for the 
right to choose from its menu of linear incentive schemes. For simplicity, we treat the case of a 
second-price auction (the first-price auction yields the same outcome from the usual equivalence 
theorem). Then the incumbent bids U 2(p) and the entrant bids u'(p\ Now, in general, the equation
U 2(P) = u'(p) yields p' '# P*(p), so that the second-price auction does not necessarily select the right
firm. The auction must thus be biased. One way of doing so is to introduce a "golden parachute" or
"cancellation fee" G (p) to be paid to the incumbent if he is replaced. So, one can envision a first­
period contracting process in which the incumbent chooses a first-period incentive scheme and a 
second-price golden parachute. The second-period allocation is determined by the above described 
auction. 
In order for the right firm to be selected, the golden parachute must satisfy: 
as the incumbent shades his second-period bid by G (p). So
�IJ , f 13*(�) , , G(p) = 'Jf (e2(x))dx - 'Jf (e (x ))dx13*(13) 
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or 
f P , , , dP* G (p) = � ['IJI (e2(x)) - 'J1 (e <P*(x))) d"jf (x)]dx.
We have: 
Proposition 8: Under assumption A, the golden parachute is positive, and increases with the 
incumbent' s efficiency (that is, G CP) � 0, G (p) < 0).
Proof of Proposition 8: For a quadratic disutility of effort, one has:
Proposition 6 implies that e2 > e' �i* . 
Q.E.D. 
As we mentioned earlier, the important result in Proposition 8 is that the golden parachute decreases 
with the firm's efficiency. 
To summarize, the optimal allocation can be implemented by a second-period auction, in 
which each firm bids for the right to be the monopoly supplier. Efficient selection is obtained by 
offering in the first-period a golden parachute together with a first-period incentive scheme. The 
golden parachute is characterized in Proposition 8. 
Rather than using cancellation fees (golElen parachutes), the regulator can have the entrant 
pay an entry fee to bias the auction. Let P (p) denote this entry fee16 (P stands for "poison pill,"
because, as a rough description, a poison pill forces a raider to pay an extra-price to acquire the 
firm). In the context of our model, an entry fee is equivalent to a negative cancellation fee (in a more
general model, the two instruments would not be perfect substitutes). Reinterpreting Proposition 8, 
we see that the entry fee should decrease with the incumbent's efficiency (P (p) > 0): An efficient
incumbent should be protected relatively less than an inefficient one. 
Last, we summarize in Table 2 our recommendations and testable implications for
transferable investments. 
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A B 
� Incumbent's performance • Probability of
(minus cost, profit) second sourcing
• Slope of the incurnbent's • Intertemporal increase in the slope
incentive schemes of the incumbent's incentive
(K i.K2) (K2-K i)
• Cancellation • Entry fee
fee
Table 2. Variables in class A are positively correlated among each other, and are negatively
correlated with the variables in class B. 
VII. A REINTERPRETATION: TAKEOVERS AND MANAGERIAL MYOPIA.
As mentioned in the introduction, our model of second sourcing can shed some light on the 
desirability of takeovers. The entrant can be reinterpreted as a raider, the incumbent as the current 
managerial team. The accounting cost stands for per-period performance (profit or stock value). 
The cost parameter (�) is a measure of the inefficiency of current management, and the effort 
variable (e) refers to the possibility of self-dealing management (appropriation of profits, luxurious
offices, personal jets, golf playing . . .  ). The reprocurement stage can be thought of as a tender 
offer.17 The rigging of bidding parity in favor of the incumbent or the entrant is a rough
formalization of defensive tactics and protakeover measures respectively.18
Our assumption that the incumbent's incentive scheme is not contingent on the entrant's 
performance translates into the assumption that the displaced managerial team does not keep 
substantial stock options in the firm after leaving. This latter assumption is made in most of the 
literature on the market for corporate control (e.g., Blair et al [1986], Grossman-Hart [1987], Harris­
Raviv [1987]). Theoretical reasons can be found to motivate it. While the arguments advanced in 
the context of regulation (in particular the collusion argument - see section III) fare less well in this 
context, it is well-known that if the managers are risk averse, the raider and displaced managers have 
ex-post an incentive to renegotiate former contracts and may let the displaced managers resell stock 
options, which no longer serve an incentive purpose and create an excessive risk in the displace 
managers' portfolio. 19
Another effect limiting the role of post-termination stock options is that, if there is no 
merger (so that the firm's stock remains traded), minority freeze-out problems are very acute. In this
case, covenants must be imposed that greatly reduce the information value of the firm (see 
Holstrom-Tirole (1987) for an informal development of this point). At a more empirical level, this 
_ �ssumpti_on also makes some sense. First, ma11y: acquired firms do not have ol1tstandif!g shares after 
the takeover. So the incumbent manager automatically exercise their stock options. Second, even if 
the raider only acquires control, many managerial contracts specify that the managers must exercise 
their options within 90 days if their employment is terminated (so, in the context of our model, the 
options are exercised well before the investment pays off). We feel that stock options encourage the 
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incumbent managers to internalize the positive externality of observable investment on the raiders'
post-takeover performance. Our point is that they very insufficiently or not at all make them
internalize the effect of investments that are not observable by the market. 20
Some implications of our model in the takeover context are (assuming that investment is 
transferred to the raider and is not of the learning by doing type): 
1. Firm performance and probability of takeover are negatively correlated.
2. The use of defensive tactics to disadvantage the raider benefits the firm's shareholders.
3. The managers are given linear incentive schemes, which can be interpreted as stock options.
Their incentive package also includes golden parachutes and/or poison pills.
4.  The incumbent manager's stock options increase over time. 
5. The size of the golden parachute is positively related to the number of stock options.
6. The size of the golden parachute is positively related to the firm's performance.
7. The amount of poison pills is negatively correlated with the incumbent manager's stock
options.
8. The amount of poison pills is negatively correlated with the firm's performance.
Conclusion 2 suggests that defensive tactics are not necessarily harmful.21 While most of
the incentive literature on the topic views takeovers as a managerial discipline device, we do feel 
that the popular fear of managerial myopia should not be neglected by economists. 
Remark 1: We should emphasize that our results are predictions for an optimal contract. Our view
that the shareholders organize a bidding contest between managerial teams may be too simplistic. 
So caution should be exercised when applying our conclusions. But it is worth noting that Walking 
and Long [1986] found that managers with large stock holdings are less likely to oppose takeovers 
than managers with small stock holdings; and that Malatesta and Walking [1986] provided evidence 
that firms who adopt poison pill defenses are relatively unprofitable. Such empirical evidence is 
consistent with our normative analysis. 
Remark 2: It is worth recalling the intuition of why the golden parachute (respectively, the poison
pill) should increase (respectively, decrease) with the manager's ability and performance. A first 
guess might have been that bad managers should be encouraged to leave through high golden 
parachutes and low poison pills. This however, is not correct, as bidding between managers already 
selects the best managers. Our point is that the auction should be rigged to encourage managers to 
invest A (good) manager with probability .9 of keeping his job picks roughly the right amount of 
investment, and further incentives are not needed. A (bad) manager probability .1 of keeping his job 
picks an inefficiently low investment (with probability .9, this investment goes to a rival manager). 
A low golden parachute of a high poison pill increase his probability of keeping his job and his 
incentive to invest. 
Remark 3: Our paper supplies an efficiency reason for foreclosing entry. That is, a social planner,
whose objective function puts equal weight on the incumbent and the entrant, biases the auctioning 
process against the entrant. When the principal is a private entity (as is the case for shareholders), 
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the contract signed between the principal and the incumbent does not internalize its effect on the 
entrant's welfare. Aghion and Bolton [1987] have shown that the desire to extract the entrant's rent 
leads the two initial parties to sign a contract that favors the incumbent (induces too little "trade" 
between the initial vertical structure and the entrant): There is socially too much foreclosure. Note 
that both Aghion and Bolton's and our theories yield the same positive implication: the incumbent 
is favored at the reprocurement stage. In our model, poison pills, for instance, have both efficiency 
as well as Aghion-Bolton's anti-competitive motives.
Remark 4: Hermalin (1987), and Stein (1988) also analyze the popular argument that the takeover
threat may lead to underinvestment. Their models differ from ours in many respects and can be 
thought of as complementary. In these analyses, investment pays off before the raider enters the 
market for corporate control (i.e., in period l, in the context of our model). Incumbent managers 
may not invest even in the presence of profitable opportunities, because the probability of success of 
the investment is positively correlated with the manager's ability, and a failure signals a low ability 
and may encourage a takeover. These papers emphasize how signaling (managerial career concerns) 
distorts managerial decisions (more generally than investments), that might convey information
about managers. Our paper assumes in contrast that investment has long-delayed effects,22 and we
focus on the intertemporal evolution of managerial profit-sharing schemes. 
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we bring some elements of answer in the agenda set by Williamson (1976) and 
the Chicago school concerning the optimal organization of franchise bidding for natural monopolies. 
We came up with a relatively pessimistic assessment of the virtues of second-sourcing (or takeover) 
when substantial investments are at stake. 23 The incumbent should be favored at the reprocurement 
stage precisely when the investment is transferable, that is when the second source is not too much at 
a cost disadvantage. Indeed the incumbent should be favored more, the higher the probability of 
second sourcing. To pursue this research it seems desirable to study various forms of non­
commitment due either to incomplete contracting and renegotiation (see Grossman-Hart (1986), 
Klein et al (1978), Tirole (1986) and Williamson (1975) for investment concerns and Laffont-Tirole 
(1988b)) for the ratcheting problem; or to the possibility of mutually advantageous renegotiation (see 
Dewatripont (1986), Hart-Tirole (1987) and Laffont-Tirole (1988a)). 
In an incomplete contract setting, property rights do sezve as switching incentives together 
with cancellation and entry fees. For instance, in defense procurement, the government sometimes 
owns the property rights on data and technological information and sometimes does not. Leaving 
the property right to the defense contractor can be viewed as a way of biasing the reprocurement 
stage in his favor; for the government must bargain with and pay some money (the equivalent of a 
cancellation fee) to the defense contractor for the right to supply the relevant information to a second 
source. Pmpet ty tights have thus some of the featmes of lire switching incetltives considered in this 
paper. In a takeover context, the corporate charter may influence the easiness with which a raider 
can take control of the firm, through super-majority provisions and staggered board elections (in this 
respect, it is interesting to note that Grossman and Hart (1987) argue informally that family-run 
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firms may sink considerable investments, and therefore may want to fight control changes through 
the allocation of voting rights). 
Last, we showed that a rich yet tractable model can be built that yields testable equilibrium 
relationships between switching incentives (like golden parachutes and poison pills), managerial 
incentive schemes (like cost sharing and stock options), probability of second sourcing and 
incumbent's performance. 
21 
APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
The optimization problem is quasi-concave (for A, small enough) and separable. For given P 
and P*CP), we can maximize the inside integral with respect to c' under the constraints (16) and
(17). The first-order condition of this control problem (see Laffont and Tirole (1987a) yields effort 
e 'CP) = e *CP\ where e *CP) is given by:
'J/(e*(p')) = 1- _A._ F(p�) 'Jf"(e*(p'))1 +A. f CP) 
for any p' < P*CP). Equation (A.1) defines the optimal effort level and therefore the optimal c'
function: 
c 'cp'1p) = p' -ki CP) - e *CP'>.
If he is selected cp' < P*CB)), the entrant has rent:
(A.1) 
(A.2) 
(A.3) 
We can now maximize (19) with respect to C 1 CB), C 2(p), B*CP) and i CB) subject to (12),
(13), and (15). 
Let µ(B) (resp. v CB)) be the multiplier of the constraint (12) (resp. (15)).
The Pontryagin's principle yields: 
Using the transversality condition at p we have:
Maximization with respect to C 1, C 2, B*, i gives.
(A.4) 
(A.5) 
(A.6) 
(A.7) 
(A.8) 
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Integrating the last line of (A.9) and using the first-order condition with respect to c' we can
replace this last line by: f (p)8kF CP*CP))(l +A.). Using the other first order conditions, (A.9)
reduces to: 
v CP) = (1 + 'A) f  CP)[d 'Cn -
8(�1 -F CP*CP)) + kF CP*CP)))J
'If (e iCP))
We first show that the following result holds: 
Lemma: v CP) � 0 for any p.
Proof Substituting (15) in (A.10) yields: 
F CP*CP)) . ' e -k 
l -F CP*CP)) 
\If C iCP))]. 
Suppose on the contrary that v CP) > 0. From (A.11) and 'I'"> 0
From 'I/' > 0, we have
(A.10) 
(A.11) 
(A.12) 
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(A.13) 
Let us now rewrite the first-order conditions relative to C 1 and C 2 as follows:
(A.14) 
(A.15) 
If v (13) > 0, the left hand side of (A.14) is larger than the left hand side of (A.15) implying
e 1 (13) > e 2(13) , a contradiction.
We see from this lemma and (A.6) and (A.7) that K 1 < K2 (since 'Jf
1(e 1(13)) < W(e2(l3))). The
first period contract is closer to a cost-plus contract than the contract of the second period. 
and 
We show now that the incumbent is favored. Let 
L\(13.13*) = (13* -ki)-(13 - i) ,
, , , A. F (13*) , , g (13* e ) = 'Jf(e ) - e + -- 'JI (e ) . ' 1 + A. f (13*) 
Using (A.6) and (A.7), (A.8) can be written: 
L\(13,13*) = max {h (l3,e2) } - max{g (13* ,e') }. 
e 2 e
' 
(A.16) 
Equation (A.16) implies that L\(13,13) < 0, as v (13) < 0 implies that h (13,e) < g (13,e) for all e . But the
definition of L\ yields L\(13,13) ;:: 0, a contradiction if 13* = 13 were the solution. But
= 1 + -- 'If (e )-- 1-1 _? 0 J.. • • d [ F ("*) l 
(A.17) 
Hence, for (A.16) to be satisfied, one needs 13* < 13, which for k = 1 implies that the incumbent i s
favored. 
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When investment is observable or when � = �· v (�) = 0. From (A.6) and (A.7), the
incumbent's effort is identical in period 1 and 2, (A.8) then yields �*(�) = �. 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 2: From Laffont and Tirole (1986), we know that, under slightly stronger
assumptions ensuring second-order conditions, we can rewrite the incentive contract of the entrant as 
a menu of incentive schemes which are linear in the cost overrun: 
with K (�) = "'(e '*(�')) and C '*(�,/�) = �· - e '*(�') - ki (�).
with 
, , , dC '* Denoting C * (� ) = C a  and remembering the second-order condition --,- 2': 0.
d � 
(A.18) 
We can now extent the reasoning to the case of the incumbent. The transfer to the 
incumbent can be decomposed into two menus of linear incentive schemes, one for each period : 
with 
and the decomposition between G 1 and G2  is arbitrary with a joint constraint (only their discounted
sum matters, but one can choose G 1 and G2  so that the I.R. constraint is binding in each period).
From (A.6), (A.7) and v(�) < 0 we see that K 1 < K2 since o/(e 1 (�)) < 'ji(e 2(�)). When
investment is observable v (�) = 0 and K 1 = K 2. 
Q.E.D. 
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Proof of Proposition 3 
The intuition for the proof is that the incumbent fully internalizes the benefits of his 
investment when k = 0. Hence, the shadow price of the first-order condition for investment, v (13) , 
should be equal to 0 even when investment is unobseivable. If v (13) = 0, then e 1 (13) = e 2(13) = e *(13)
from (A.6) and (A.7). (A.10) yields 
d
1 
(i (13)) = 8(1 - F (13*(13))). (A.19) 
and (A.9) is then satisfied. The functions i (13) and 13*(13) are defined by equations (A.8) and (A. 19).
Note that (A.8) can be rewritten as: 
where 
13* - (13 - i )  = max {g (13,e )} - max {g (13* ,e )} ,
e e 
- A. F (l3) I g (13,e) = 'Jf(e ) - e + 
1 + A. f (l3) 'I' (e ) . 
(A.2 0) 
From the envelope theorem and the monotone hazard rate condition, the right-hand side of (A 20) is
decreasing in 13* and is thus positive for 13* < 13. Now suppose that 13* ::; 13 - i .  Then 13* < 13 and thus
the right-hand side of (A. 20) is strictly positive, while the left-hand side is non-positive, a
contradiction. We conclude that 13* > 13 - i .
Proof of Proposition 4 
The first-order conditions of the regulator's quasi-concave maximization problem are : 
1 1 1 A F (13') n 1 1 'I' (e (13 )) = 1 -
1 + A. f (13) 'I' (e <13 ))
1 A F (13) n 'I' (e 1 (13)) = 1 + Ba + ob (1 - F (13*(13))) - 1 + A. f (l3) 'I' (e 1 (13))
I A F (l3) n 'I' (e 2(13)) = 1 - 1 + A. f (l3) (1 - a - b ) 'Jf  (e 2(13))
Q.E.D. 
(A .21)
(A.22) 
(A.2 3) 
-------+Ll3=-_,_,_be"-11�(j3LJ)-=-_.,_e 'A2(µ,13),-=i+=-iljl'-\<Ll(e 2$)) - (j3* - e 1(j3*)_±Jjl(�e 1w(l3.___,*)'h))._____ ______ _______,(,�A=.2,_._4),___ ___ _______, 
- _A._ F (13*) ' e '  A* - 1 - a - b F (13) , e A 1 + A. [ f <13*) "' ( (1-1 )) ( ) f (13) "' ( 2(1-1))) 
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At a = 0, 13* = 13. Differentiating (A.24) and using (A.2 1) and (A.23) gives 
d!* < 0 for any
a ,  which proves Proposition 4. 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 6: We will assume that 13*(13) and v (13) are differentiable. This can be proved
by using the implicit function theorem and the first-order conditions. 
Let us first note that, �* (�) < 1 .  This is due to the fact that 13*(�) = � and 13*(13) < 13 for
13 > 13 (from Proposition 1) . -
Second, we know that e' = e '(l3*(13)) is equal to e2 = e2(13) at 13 = � (from Proposition 1) .
Hence, at �· one has e2 > e' �� .  But differentiating (A.8) in the uniform-quadratic case, and using
the first-order conditions (A.6) and (A.7) yields : 
� - A. [ ,� l ez dv l- d l3 - l + A. e d l3 -ez - l + A. d 13 ·
This implies that at 13 = �· dv Id 13 is negative. Now 
d , de' �  de2 °"dj3 (e -ez) = d l3' d l3 - d l3 ·
Using (A.6) and (A.7) in the linear-quadratic case yields: 
d , A. [ d 13* ] 1 dv 
d l3
(e -ez) = 1 + A.  
l-d"jf
+
l + A. d j3
But (A.25) implies that, at 13 = �· 
1 -
d 13* < - � dv so that
d l3 l + A. d l3 
d ' 1 dv [ A.e2 ]
d l3 
(e - e2) < l + A. d l3 1 - l + A.  
< 0,
(A.25) 
(A.26) 
as e2 (�) - I and I > (IJ(I + X)) . So, e' < e2 m a  neighborhood of�· Now, consider the lowest f3 > � 
such that: 
' d l3* either A: e (13) d"jf (13) = e 2(13)
or B :  e
'
(p) = e z(P) 
or e:  
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Condition A cannot be satisfied strictly before B or C is, as � �* < 1 and e ' < e 2 in a
neighborhood of �· 
Suppose �at condition B is satisfied. So, at this �. e ' d}1* � e 2 and � �* � 1. The first
inequality, together with (A.2 5) implies that 
(A.2 7) 
so that :; � 0. Using (A.2 6), and by the same reasoning as before, we obtain
d , 1 dv [ A.e 2  J d � (e - e 2) :::;; l + A. d �  1- l + A. � O (A.2 8) 
(as e 2(�) = e
'(�*(�)) < 1, from equation (A. 1)). So the function e ' - e 2  cannot become positive at �.
as it is negative earlier and has a negative slope.  
Last, suppose condition C is satisfied. Equation (A.2 5) can be rewritten as:  
But (A.6) and (A.7) yield: 
, 1 dv e - e z = 1 + A, d p . 
(A.2 9) 
(A.30) 
It is easy to see that (A.29) and (A.30) are inconsistent unless e 2  = 1 �A,  .20 But, from (A.6), and the
fact that v(�) < 0, e 2 > 1 - 1 �A,  . Since we assumed that 1 > 2 /J(l + A), we obtain a contradiction.
Thus, neither of the three conditions, A , B , or C can obtain to the right of �· This proves 
Proposition 6. 
Q.EJ): 
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FOOTNOTES 
1) See also Goldberg (1976), and in the context of the regulation of electric utilities,  Joskow and
Schmalensee (1983). An early reference on the topic is Pigou (1920) (see Goldberg (1981) for
a description of his contribution).
2) Williamson (1976) also mentions administrative and political incumbency advantages which
we will not study here.
3) Williamson also makes the important point that contracts are necessarily incomplete. Indeed,
investment has been a major concern in the literature on the expropriation of relation-specific
investment under incomplete contracting (Williamson (1975, 1985) Grossman-Hart (1986).
Hart-Moore (1985) Green and Laffont (1988)). While we also emphasize investment
incentives, our paper departs from this literature in several important respects. First, it
assumes away unforeseen contingencies and analyzes complete contracting. Second, the
literature on incomplete contracting studies the role of ownership; we take ownership as given,
and analyze switching incentives. Third, whether the parties can contract on investment does
not matter in the absence of second sourcing in our model (while it does under incomplete
contracting); assuming incomplete contracting away allows us to focus on the effects of
second sourcing in a cleaner way.
4) 'JI,,, ;::: 0 makes stochastic schemes non-optimal (see Laffont and Tirole (1987)).
5) This assumption of monotone hazard rate prevents bunching in the static model. It is satisfied
by most usual distributions (uniform, exponential, Pareto, logistic .. . ).
6) See Laffont and Tirole (1988a) (1988b) for analyses of procurement with renegotiation proof
commitment and short-term commitments respectively.
7) Because of our commitment assumption we need only consider an intertemporal individual
rationality constraint.
8) For k = 1, the problem is always quasi-concave. For k * 1, the marginal cost of the
investment high enough is a sufficient condition for quasi-concavity (see Laffont and Tirole
(1987a)).
9) It should be noted that when one of the parties' preferences is not quasi-linear, an informed
principal (regulator) strictly gains by not revealing his information to the agent (entrant) at or
before the contract proposal stage. That is, by pooling at the contract proposal stage , the
different types of principal (referring here to the possible values of �. by abuse of terminology)
can trade the slack variables corresponding to the agent's individual rationality and incentive
compatibility constraints. This may introduce a tension between first period efficiency and
optimal regulation of the entrant. Also, the Maskin-Tirole result applies as long as the
principal's information does not enter the agent's utility function (in particular, the agent's
information can enter the principal's objective function, as is the case here) .
. An altemative pr.opf of 1he fact 1hat it is harmful to induce pp_olingin period 1 can be .given
as follows. From Laffont-Tirole (l 987b) we know that the second period mechanism can be 
implemented by a dominant strategy (Vickrey) auction, which makes irrelevant the 
information transmitted by the observation of C 1 . Then, pooling induces no gain on the 
second period and is harmful in the first. 
10) See Guesnerie and Laffont (1984).
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11) If the marginal cost of investment is high enough, the first-order approach we take here in this
moral hazard problem is valid.
12) Note also that common auctions for contract renewal belong to the class of mechanisms
considered here.
13) For extensions of this result see Laffont and Tirole (1987b), McAfee and McMillan (1987),
Caillaud and et al. (1986), Melumad and Reichelstein (1986), Picard (1987), Rogerson ( 1 987).
14) Apply the Lemma in the Appendix to equation (A.10).
15) These conditions are sufficient for b2 o small.
16) P (�) must satisfy: u' ( �* (�) ) - P (�) = U 2(�) .
17) There is of course a large diversity of ways to acquire firms, from friendly mergers to proxy
fights. The view that managerial teams bid against each other may be a good first
approximation, and is taken, e.g. in Blair et. al. (1986), Grossman-Hart (1987) and
Harris-Raviv (1987). It should be noted that other reasonable descriptions of the auctioning
process would yield similar results as in this paper. For instance, suppose that the raider buys
up the whole firm, which then goes private. The auction is then equivalent to offering a
fixed-priced contract to the second source (that is, the raider is made residual claimant for the
firm's second-period profit). Redoing the analysis by assuming that only a fixed-priced
contract can be offered to the entrant does not alter our intuitions.
Note also that our allowing discrimination among the raider's types yields the result that 
after a takeover, the firm goes private (K' = 1) when the raider is very efficient (� close to �),
and does not when the raider is less efficient ( K' < 1 for higher �s ) .  
-
18) A slight difference with our social planner formulation is that the shareholders do not care
directly about the managers' welfare. But none of our qualitative results is affected by this
change in the principal's objective function.
19) See Fudenberg-Tirole (1988) for an analysis of this issue in a model without takeovers.
20) While the process of investing per se is likely to be observed by the market, the investment
expenditure may not be straightforwardly derived from accounting data (recall Williamson's
argument), and the quality of the investment may be hard to assess. In a similar spirit, Ruback
(1986, p. 72) argues that "the management of most corporations has private information about
the future prospects of the firm. This information usually includes plans, strategies, ideas, and
patents that cannot be made public. Even if they are efficient, market prices cannot include the
value of information that the market does not have." To the extent that plans, strategies, ideas,
and patents result from investments, Ruback's argument fits with the notion that a non­
negligible fraction of investment is not reflected in the market valuation of the firm. So, we
feel that post-termination stock options, although they can not be fully ruled out, are at most a
limited instrument to induce managers to invest.
21) We suspect that the many shark repellants are far from being substitutes and involve fairly
different social costs. It would also be worthwhile investigating how each favors the
incumbent managerial team.
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22) Closer in spirit to our work is the signal-jamming model of Stein (1987) in which a manager
overborrows to mislead the market about his firm's  worth.
23) We considered the case where the number of potential entrants was exogenous (actually equal
to one but the analysis generalizes straightforwardly to any number) . When this number is
endogenous and increases with the expected rent to be gained in the second period auction,
new effects should be taken into account. Favoring entrants now increases the
competitiveness of the second period auction.
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